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Predicates and Predicaments
The distinction between individual-level and stage-level predicates has interested
grammarians for a number of reasons. In English, this distinction interacts with a
variety of apparently unrelated syntactic constructions. In some constructions the
different sorts of predicates show a contrast in interpretation, and in others they
show a contrast in grammaticality. This is particularly interesting because the dis-
tinction is not a matter of traditional syntactic category like noun or verb phrase.
It seems to be a semantic classification, although delineating it precisely in terms
of meaning has proven difficult, at least outside a particular theoretical viewpoint.
Complicating things further, a number of contextual and pragmatic factors can
affect the tests taken to be diagnostic of the distinction. Many languages display
grammatical effects due to the two kinds of predicates, suggesting that this distinc-
tion is fundamental to the way humans think about the universe.
This study is confined, for the most part, to data from English, and so it over-
looks a growing body of work on the ILP/SLP distinction in other languages: for
example, Diesing (1992) on German, Doherty (1996) on Irish, Kratzer (1988) on
German, Kuroda (1992) on Japanese, Willie (1999) on Navajo, and Sasse (1987)
on a wide variety of languages.
1. Characterizations of the Distinction
Since the work of Milsark (1974) and Carlson (1977), the distinction between
individual-level predicates (ILPs) and stage-level predicates (SLPs) has been at the
forefront of the development of theories about the syntax-semantics interface (e.g.,
Kratzer 1988, Diesing 1992, Krifka et al. 1995). Milsark's (1974, 1977) original
proposal of the distinction between "state-descriptive" (SLP) and "property" (ILP)
predicates is introduced as follows:
1
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4 Predicates and Temporal Arguments
It would be of great value at this point to be able to point out some independent
criteria for telling the difference between state-descriptive and property predicates.
The best I can do is to suggest some tendencies and rules of thumb, plus an impre-
cise definition or two. Properties are those facts about entities which are assumed
to be, even if they are not in fact, permanent, unalterable, and in some sense pos-
sessed by the entity, while states are conditions which are, at least in principle, tran-
sitory, not possessed by the entity of which they are predicated, and the removal of
which causes no change in the essential qualities of the entity. (1974:212)
This discussion presents the distinction as one that distinguishes essential, perma-
nent properties of an entity from accidental states that the entity might be found
in. In Milsark (1977), this is repeated:
States [are] conditions in which an entity finds itself and which are subject to change
without there being an essential alteration of the entity. . . [Properties] are descrip-
tions which name some trait possessed by the entity and which is assumed to be
more or less permanent or at least to be such that some significant change in the
character of the entity will result if the description is altered. (1977:12f.)
Milsark (1974) offers the following lists of representative predicates:
(1) SLPs
sick
hungry
tired
alert
clothed
naked
drunk
stoned
closed
open
etc.
ILPs
all NP PREDs
shapes
colors
intelligent
beautiful
boring
crazy
etc.
This classification applies to verbal predicates as well, as Milsark (1977) notes. Most
are stage-level (e.g., kick over a trash can, eat supper, think lovely thoughts), but some
are individual-level (e.g. own a hank, have long arms, know how to fly an airplane).
And Hana Philip pointed out to me that nominals are not ILPs in all languages: in
the Slavic family, case markers seem to make a difference in the sort of predicate
one has.
In introducing this distinction, connections are made on one hand between
being a property predicate and tending to remain true of an entity over time, and
on the other between being a state-description and freely changing applicability
over time. While the latter connection does not seem to be problematic, the former
is: even though predicates like be blond(e), and be French are individual-level, they
are not literally permanent properties because we can imagine an individual chang-
ing status, even repeatedly, with respect to the property. On the other hand, as
Carlson (1977:72) notes, some SLPs—like be dead—are permanent. Whatever sense
of permanence is crucial to this distinction, it must be a very weak notion. For
example, Chierchia proposes that ILPs are tendentially stable while SLPs are not:
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Predicates and Predicaments 5
The main characteristic of individual] -level predicates is that they ascribe tendentially
permanent properties to their arguments. It seems that one can say of an argument
with an individual] -level property P, "Once a P, tendentially always a P." (1995b:198)
Chierchia proposes that the non-necessary tendency toward permanence that ILPs
have is a result of inherent genericity. However, the tendential stability character-
ization is problematic as well. Predicates like be an infant, and be a child are classi-
fied as individual-level, but by no means do we expect infants to remain infants or
children to remain children. On the contrary, in a world in which everything fol-
lows its normal course, these states will occupy a relatively small portion of an
entity's existence. We must admit, then, that the permanence of ILPs is intuitive
but elusive. In our discussion of the diagnostic tests, and in particular in our later
discussion of "coercion," the temporally persistent nature of ILPs will be an im-
portant theme.
Carlson's (1977) discussion of this distinction views the difference as essentially
one of domain for the predicates: ILPs are predicates of individuals, while SLPs
are predicates of "stages." He writes, "A stage is conceived of as being, roughly, a
spatially and temporally bounded manifestation of something.. .. An individual,
then, is (at least) that whatever-it-is that ties a series of stages together to make
them stages of the same thing" (68). Carlson later wrote:
[The ILP/SLP distinction] is correlated with the sort of entity the predicate mean-
ingfully applies to. If the predicate speaks of general characteristics, or dispositions,
we represent it as applying to a set of objects. If something more fleeting is intended,
somehow more temporary, and in some sense less intrinsic to the nature of a given
individual, the predicate is represented as denoting a set of stages. This distinction
is intended to correspond to the basically atemporal nature of individuals as op-
posed to their time-bound stages. (1979:57)
The difference between ILPs and SLPs, on this view, is that the former characterize
individuals, while the latter present eventualities that take place and involve the
stage of an individual. Carlson's characterization commits stage-level predications
to an essential spatiotemporal location. This theme is continued in Kratzer (1988),
where SLPs are distinguished as having an inherent spatiotemporal argument that
ILPs lack.
The ILP/SLP distinction has been assumed to give rise to a number of gram-
matical effects. These effects involve the grammaticality requirements and inter-
pretational possibilities of a number of constructions. These will be examined in
detail in chapter 2, but I will summarize them here. The existential construction
permits only SLPs in its coda (Milsark 1974,1977). Bare plural and indefinite sub-
jects also show ILP/SLP effects: as we will see, subjects of ILPs must be construed
strongly (Milsark 1974,1977). This phenomenon forces bare plural subjects of ILPs
to have a generic interpretation rather than an existential one (Carlson 1977), and
indefinites that cannot be construed strongly (e.g., sm and, ordinarily, a) sound
quite odd in this environment. Another diagnostic is the position of the predicate
in the small clause complement to perception verbs; only SLPs are grammatical in
this environment (Carlson 1977). When adjuncts (Carlson 1979, Kratzer 1988) and
absolute adjuncts (Stump 1985) show a contrast in possible interpretations depend-
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6 Predicates and Temporal Arguments
ing on whether they contain a SLP or an ILP. Finally, Carlson (1982) and Kratzer
(1988) have argued that temporal and locative modifiers are grammatical only when
the main predicate of a sentence is stage-level. Other researchers have proposed
additional constructions in which the ILP/SLP distinction has a role, but the ones
that will be central to our investigation are mentioned above.
The terms used in this classification of predicates are due to Carlson, who dis-
tinguishes SLPs and ILPs from a third level that he calls "kind-level predicates"
(KLPs). KLPs denote properties that logically cannot have individual objects as their
arguments. Rather, they are predicates of kinds, species, or classes of objects. The
examples below contain KLPs:
(2) a. Wolves were widespread in North America.
b. Dinosaurs are extinct.
c. This kind of tree is indigenous to California.
These examples cannot be interpreted as generalizations about members of a group.
For example, (2a) does not mean that in general, if you find a wolf it will be wide-
spread in North America, and (2c) does not mean that a particular individual tree
is indigenous. Instead, these are claims about the class of wolves and the kind of
tree being indicated. Carlson (1977) is the classical work on kinds and their predi-
cates; see also Krifka et al. (1995) for a recent overview of relevant issues and pre-
vious work. Issues involving KLPs are not of central concern in this investigation,
but they will occasionally enter into the discussion. ILPs and SLPs interact with
each other in subtle ways, but KLPs do not interact with the other levels in the same
way, and this is the reason that they will generally be ignored.
2. Stativity
In the course of this investigation, issues involving Aktionsart will keep popping
up. Aktionsart deals with the aspectual characteristics inherent in sentences and
determined largely by the head of the sentence's main predicate. Vendler (1967)
distinguishes four verbal classes: states, activities, accomplishments, and achievements.
Dowty (1979), in his discussion of "the Aristotle-Ryle-Kenny-Vendler Verb Clas-
sification," provides a summary of earlier work on Aktionsart. Verkuyl (1972) shows
that the distinction must really take the whole verb phrase into account and not
simply the verb. Dowry (1979) has examples, discussed below, which appear to show
that even the subject of the sentence can contribute to the classification. Work on
Aktionsart is ongoing: Smith (1991) adds semelfactive as a distinct class; and see
Verkuyl (1993) and ter Meulen (1995) for recent accounts of these phenomena.
The ILP/SLP distinction overlaps significantly with the stative/non-stative
aspectual distinction, but the two distinctions do not quite make the same di-
vision among the non-KLP predicates. Lakoff (1965) provides a number of tests
for the stative/non-stative distinction, some of which involve the orthogonal
issue of agentivity. Those that do not test for agentivity involve the ability to
appear in the progressive and the ability to appear in the pseudo-cleft construe-
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Predicates and Predicaments 7
tion; Lakoff claims that only non-statives have both of these abilities. These
claims are supported by the data below:
(3) a. *Robin is knowing the answer.
b. ""What Robin did was know the answer.
(4) a. Robin is reaching a decision.
b. What Robin did was reach a decision.
Carlson (1977) claimed that individual-level verbs cannot appear in the progres-
sive, and this raises the question of whether the progressive is properly seen as
excluding states or as excluding ILPs.
As it turns out, all ILPs are stative, and all non-statives are SLPs. The only rea-
son we have for positing the existence of the ILP/SLP distinction at all is that there
exist some stative SLPs. Some of these are PPs and APs that are overtly locative
(e.g., on the lawn, airborne), but others are not (e.g., out of their minds with worry,
drunk, naked). For simple verbal predicates, the ILP/SLP distinction coincides nearly
exactly with the stative/non-stative distinction, although things will get more com-
plicated when we consider predicates with clausal complements in chapter 6. There
is one group of verbs, discussed by Dowty (1979), which displays complex behav-
ior in this respect. These are verbs like sit, stand, and flow, which are sometimes
used statively and sometimes not. In particular, they can appear in the progressive
with certain subjects, but not with others. Dowty notes the following contrasts, from
his examples (62) & (67):
(5) a. The socks are lying under the bed.
a'. ??New Orleans is lying at the mouth of the Mississippi River.
b. Your glass is sitting near the edge of the table,
b'. ??John's house is sitting at the top of a hill.
c. The long box is standing on end.
c'. ??The new building is standing at the corner of First Avenue and Main Street.
d. One corner of the piano is resting on the bottom step,
d'. ??That argument is resting on an invalid assumption.
Dowty proposes that in the cases in which the progressive is permissible, the VP is
being used as a SLP, and when it is not, the VP is used as an ILP. These predicates,
which Dowty calls "interval statives," are taken to be individual-level just in case
the subject denotes the sort of thing that cannot ordinarily change its physical
position from the one described by the predicate: New Orleans always lies at the
mouth of the Mississippi River, but the socks do not always lie under the bed. It
seems, then, that there are stative verbs that can serve as the heads of SLPs, and
that these statives can appear in the progressive. These are the only stative verbs
that appear able to head a stage-level predicate.
The progressive does not make a clearcut distinction between all ILPs and SLPs,
however, and this makes it difficult to use as a diagnostic for the ILP/SLP distinc-
tion, at least until we consider its coercive effect:
(6) a. *Sam is being on the ship,
b. Sam is being a hero.
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8 Predicates and Temporal Arguments
(7) a. Sam is being careful,
b. Sam is being an idiot.
The locative in (6a) is a SLP, and the nominal predicate in (6b) is an ILP, and yet
the progressive is acceptable with the latter and not with the former. In chapter 4
we will see reasons to believe that the progressive can "coerce" a stative predicate
into becoming a non-stative predicate (all of the latter are SLPs), with a predict-
able change in interpretation resulting. Dowty (1979:114, 115) argues that in (7),
careful and an idiot are ambiguous between stative and agentive readings, and that
copular predicates in the progressive, therefore, adhere to the stative/non-stative
distinction (see 130, fn. 6). However, his analysis of the examples in (5) suggests
that for verbal predicates, the progressive is sensitive to the ILP/SLP distinction,
supporting Carlson's claim to this effect.
Kenny (1963:175) notes an additional means of distinguishing stative and non-
stative verbs. English non-stative verbs tend strongly to have a habitual or generic
interpretation when they appear in the simple present:
(8) a. Sam sits by the fire after supper,
b. Surgeons cook for themselves.
Such sentences can also have a "reportive present," typified by a sportscaster's play-
by-play or newspaper headline usage; however, they do not have the ordinary exis-
tential reading found with other tenses. Although we will see that the unavailabil-
ity of existential readings for bare plural subjects and the ungrammaticality of weak
nominal subjects can be indications that the predicate is individual-level, the judg-
ments in (8) arise independently of the ILP/SLP contrast. Note that a generic in-
terpretation is required even when the subject is independently referential, as in
(8a). This is not what we see when the predicate is individual-level (cf. Sam is in-
telligent). Further, the predicates in (8) pass the tests for stage-level status when
they appear in the past tense. We clearly do not want to say, however, that it is a
characteristic of SLPs that they have generic readings in the simple present; stative
SLPs (e.g., be excited, be available) do not have the generic reading, and they allow
weak subjects:
(9) a. Sam is excited.
b. Surgeons are prepared for the operation.
c. Sm surgeons are prepared for the operation.
Thus, we must conclude that the generic reading for the simple present and the
ungrammaticality of weak subjects is a property of non-stative predicates, and that
this issue is independent of the ILP/SLP distinction. This discussion shows that
the bare-plural and weak-subject tests for SLP status (discussed in chapter 2) can-
not be applied blindly in the simple present for non-stative predicates. The tests
are reliable, however, in the present progressive, present perfect, and past tenses
(with any aspect). The English simple present is idiosyncratic in requiring generic
interpretations for non-stative predicates. Other languages (e.g., German) do not
have this restriction, and the simple present can mean what English speakers use
the present progressive for. Because there are other languages that do not have this
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Predicates and Predicaments 9
restriction, it is clear that the English facts are due to a quirk of grammar and not
to some deep principle of logic.
We conclude that the ILP/SLP distinction cannot be reduced to previously
known aspectual distinctions. The fact that stative SLPs exist makes reduction to
the stative/non-stative distinction impossible. Because the stative/non-stative dis-
tinction is so close to the ILP/SLP distinction, we must exercise caution in our work;
otherwise, we may accidentally identify a stativity distinction as one of predicate
levels. By including stative SLPs in our diagnostics, we can avoid this problem.
3. The Theses
If the ILP/SLP effects are really indicative of a binary, lexical classification of predi-
cates, then the constructions that show the effects should always yield consistent
results when taken as diagnostics for the binary classification. Carlson (1977) and
Stump (1985) showed that there is a class of copular predicates which behave
like typical SLPs from the point of view of the existential construction and the
indefinite subject effect, but which are ungrammatical in the small clause comple-
ment to perception verbs. Later, Kratzer (1988) pointed out that there is another
class of predicates (the "unaccusative" ILPs, in her terminology) which behave
like SLPs for the existential construction and the indefinite subject diagnostics,
but not for temporal and locative modification. Previous work has focused pri-
marily on data involving very simple predicates; when predicates of greater syn-
tactic complexity are considered, the uniformity of the effects will be seen to break
down still further. I will investigate such cases in chapter 6. Carlson (1977) briefly
discusses what happens when predicates of different levels are embedded in the
complements of raising verbs; in the present work, they will be subjected to a
wider range of diagnostics. The effects of embedding ILPs and SLPs in the comple-
ments of control verbs and propositional attitudes will also be examined, along
with cases in which SLPs appear as modifiers of heads that are independently
classified as ILPs.
Some of the differences between ILPs and SLPs result from the ability or inabil-
ity of a clause to delimit cases for the purpose of quantification; these effects are
seen with when and with absolute adjuncts when they restrict certain modals. Other
effects are due to the ability or inability of clauses to delimit multiple cases for the
purposes of quantification; this is evident when absolute and when adjuncts ap-
pear with adverbs of quantification. I will use the term "subject effects" to include
the existential construction and the diagnostics that concern bare plurals and the
possibility of indefinite subjects to be construed weakly. The grammaticality of
perceptual reports constitutes a fourth set of effects.
There are, I think, a number of widely held assumptions about individual- and
stage-level predicates that have not been sufficiently scrutinized. Certain previous
analyses have suffered because of their assumption that the ILP/SLP distinction
depends entirely on a classification of the predicate's head (along with, perhaps,
some ill-understood pragmatic factors). In this book I will argue that, in many cases,
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10 Predicates and Temporal Arguments
it is necessary to consider the entire predicate before its proper classification can
be attempted with success.
It has been widely assumed that predicates that are not KLPs fit into either the
SLP or the ILP group, or else they are ambiguous, but it is constantly acknowl-
edged that there are ways in which a predicate from one level can be taken to be a
predicate from the other level. But making such a claim should have empirical
consequences. In general, language users are quite adept at concocting interpreta-
tions for strings of words that are thrown at them and are purported to be sen-
tences. When a predicate of one level is used in an environment that favors predi-
cates of the other level, the interpretation of the predicate is coerced according to a
small number of predictable patterns. Once we identify the patterns, we can test
whether coercion has actually occurred in any given instance.
The analysis developed in this book draws heavily on existing work, particu-
larly that of Kratzer (1988) and Carlson (1977). The cases of nonuniformity that
we find among the diagnostics will naturally be explained by trying to be clearer
about what each of the tests diagnoses. I will claim that ILPs and SLPs have a con-
glomerate of properties that different diagnostics pick out. The heart of my analy-
sis is built on a fairly implicit assumption in Kratzer (1988): that there is a type-
theoretic distinction between ILPs and SLPs because only the latter can have a
spatiotemporal argument. Of course, Carlson (1977) was the first to propose that
the predicates be distinguished type-theoretically. We will see evidence from per-
ceptual reports and from free and absolute adjuncts that the ILP/SLP distinction
can be maintained after the predicate composes with its subject. An assumption
compatible with Kratzer's distinction will fare better in allowing a formal treat-
ment of this observation. In addition to the type-theoretic distinction, we will find
reason to believe that SLPs are potentially anaphoric and that ILPs are not, sug-
gesting that a dynamic analysis is called for. We will also identify what sorts of
pragmatic factors are involved with certain diagnostics, and we will develop pre-
cise ways of telling when they are exerting their influence.
In chapter 2, the traditional diagnostics will be examined with respect to simple
predicates. Chapter 3 presents traditional analyses for each of these groups of ef-
fects; the discussion will focus on the work of Carlson, Stump, Kratzer, Diesing,
and de Hoop and de Swart. In chapter 4, we pause to consider again the basis of
the ILP/SLP distinction, and then we investigate coercion, the precise means by
which the classification of a predicate can be changed. We will explore what pos-
sibilities Kratzer's and Carlson's theories allow for the change in meaning that ac-
companies coercion. Chapters 5 and 6 lay the groundwork for the theory devel-
oped in chapter 7. The first of these considers the consequences of previous work,
arguing for three large points: first, that the ILP/SLP distinction is visible at syn-
tactic nodes dominating tenseless clauses; second, that adverbial quantification is
subject both to a prohibition against vacuous quantification (Kratzer 1988) and
to a plurality condition (de Hoop and de Swart 1989); and finally, that SLPs are
anaphoric but ILPs are not. Chapter 6 follows this with a presentation of data that
have received little discussion in previous work. The effects of definite nominals,
clausal complements, and clausal modifiers will be considered. This is followed by
consideration of ways of extending the analyses of Kratzer, Diesing, and Carlson
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Predicates and Predicaments 11
to account for more complex predicates. This discussion poses serious problems
for the Mapping Hypothesis of Diesing (1992) and Kratzer (1988), and it calls for
a theory that allows SLPs and ILPs to be derived compositionally.
Finally, chapter 7 develops the analysis based on the type-theoretic distinction
implicit in Kratzer (1988). I focus only on the temporal portion of the extra argu-
ment found in SLPs and consider the predictions that the analysis makes for how
time is used in propositions described by SLPs as opposed to ILPs. Because time is
an argument of SLPs but not of ILPs, time will be a constituent in a SLP-based
proposition.
As for the basis of the distinction, rather than claiming that ILPs are tendentially
stable, or that we assume they are, I will conclude what the formal account forces
me to conclude: that SLPs describe characteristics of individuals that hold in space
and time—we might even say that they describe spatiotemporal slices of the world;
and that ILPs are independent of space and time.
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